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LEGISLATION
Constitutional Aspects of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
State legislation directed toward governmental regulation of hours,
wages, and child labor has been a familiar phenomenon of American history during the past century.1 Only recently, however, has the Federal
Government invaded this domain. 2 Proposals for a national thirty-hour
week I were interrupted by the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 4 under which the various codes sought wage and hour regulation. In turn, the codes were nullified by the Schechter decision.5 With
regard to child labor, two major attempts by the Federal Government prior
to N. R. A. directed toward its prohibition, met defeat, 6 and a proposed7
Constitutional Amendment passed by Congress in 1924 remains unratified.
Aware of the inadequacy of state attempts to find a satisfactory solution to a problem national in scope,8 and spurred by the President's
message of May 24, 1937," Congress undertook to formulate a statute
designed to satisfy the needs of labor 10 without exceeding the limitations
imposed by the Constitution. As a result, the original bills, after extensive modification, were enacted in present form on June 14, 1938.11
Provisions of the Act

Finding interstate commerce 12 to be seriously affected by labor conditions in industries engaged in such commerce, or in the production of
goods for such commerce, in a manner detrimental to a minimum standard
of living,'2 the expressed legislative purpose of the Act, therefore, is "to
See Mass. Acts & Resolves

Conn. Laws (1842)

C.28; CoMMONs
(1842) c. 6o;
I.
CuMAND ANDEWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION (4th ed. 1936) PP. 54, 83,
mINS, THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1935) 579; Proceedings of

the FourthNational Conference on Labor Legislation, I8 BULL. 91
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(937).

2. For example, earlier federal acts, as well as important recent legislation, dealt
with hours of employment and wages of government employees: i5STAT. 77 (i868) ;
27 STAT. 340 (1892), 40 U. S. C. A. §321 (928) ; 37 STAT. 137 (912), 40 U. S. C.
A. §324 (1928) ;49 STAT. 65o (i935), 39 U. S. C. A. § 832 (Supp. 1937) ; employees
of concerns holding government contracts: 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C. A.
§ 35 (Supp. 1937); employees of interstate carriers: 34 STAT. 1415 (907), 45 U. S.
C.A. §6I et seq. (1928) ; 39 STAT.721 (i916), 45 U. S. C. A. § 65 (928).
3.Moulton and Leven, The Thirty-Hour Week (i935) 4. The Committee refused
for fear of itsbecoming a maximum
to write a minimum wage provision into the bill
wage. Hearings before Committee on; Labor on H. R. 7202, H. R. 4116, H. R. 8492,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (i934), at 30.
4. 48 STAT. 195 (i933), i5 U. S. C. A. § 7oi et seq. (Supp. 1937).
5.Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S.495 (935).
6. 39 STAT. 675 (1916), declared unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U. S. 251 (iqi8), and 40 STAT. 1138 (i919), held unconstitutional in Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
7. 43 STAT. 670 (1924). CoMMoNs AND ANDREwS, op. cit. supra note I,at 98, 174;
CUMMINs, op. cit. supra note I,at 58o.
8. 81 CONG. REc. 1445 (App. 1937). Illustrative of the intense interest in the prob-

blem is the fact that in 1936 thirty to thirty-five bills were introduced in Congress dealing with child labor. Proceedings of the Fourth National Conference on Labor Legislation, i8 BULL. 107 (i937).
9. H. R. REP.No. 1452, 7 5th Cong., ist Sess. (i937) at 5.

io.Labor, however, has not been unanimously in favor of general minimum wage
regulation. Proceedings of the Fourth National Conference on Labor Legislation, i8
BULL. 82-88 (1937) ;CUMMINS, op. cit. supra note I,at 271. See generally, SEN. REP.
No. 884, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (i937), H. R. REP. No. 1452, 7 5 th Cong., ist Sess.

(i937), H. R. REP. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).

ii. Pub. L. No. 718, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 14, 1938).
12. "Commerce" is defined as meaning ". . . trade, commerce, transportation,
transmission, or communication among the several States . . ." in § 3 (b).
13. § 2 (a).
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c6rrect and as rapidly as practical to eliminate the conditions above referred
to in such industries without substantially curtailing employment or earning power." 14 In the Department of Labor a Wage and Hour Division
has been created, directed by an Administrator, appointed by the President, who is required to submit annual reports covering his activities and
containing recommendations for further legislation. 15 The Administrator
is to appoint industry committees for each industry engaged in interstate
commerce or in the production of goods for such commerce, the membership of which shall contain equal number of representatives of the public,
employees, and employers.' 6
A minimum wage rate of twenty-five cents an hour is provided for
the first year of the operation of the Act with power vested in the Administrator to prescribe a rate as high as forty cents. For six years thereafter
the minimum rate has been established at thirty cents with a similar power
in the Administrator to prescribe rates up to forty cents. After seven
years from the effective date of the Act the minimum rate is to be forty
cents or a rate, not less than thirty cents, to be prescribed by the Administrator.'7 In order to attain the primary objective of the Act, a forty cent
minimum, as rapidly as possible without curtailing employment and, at
the same time, recognizing that diversity of present wage scales is the rule
rather than the exception, the Administrator, preparatory to promulgating
the wage orders permitted by Section 6, is required to convene, as rapidly
as possible, industry committees's who are to recommend to the Administrator wage rates and classifications for their respective industries or subdivisions thereof.' 9 The Administrator, after a hearing, shall either approve the recommendation of the committee or, if he disapprove, shall
resubmit the matter.20
Section 7 prohibits the employment of any employee engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for such commerce for a work week
longer than forty-four hours during the first year of the operation of the
Act, longer than forty-two hours during its second year, and longer than
forty hours after the expiration of the second year, unless compensation
at an overtime rate is granted. No violation of these provisions shall be
deemed to have occurred in the case of certain departures 21 from the
standard schedule resulting either from collective bargaining agreements
certified by the National Labor Relations Board, or from the seasonal
nature of an industry. Section IO supplies the procedure governing court
review.
Under Section 12, goods may not be shipped in interstate commerce
which have been produced in an establishment in or about which oppressive
L4. §2

(b).

15. §4 (a) (b) (c)(d).
16. § 5 (a) (b) (c)(d). It has been suggested that the selection of representafives for the Industry Committee will create complications comparable to those experienced under the N. R. A. Phila. Legal Intelligencer, July 25, 1938, p. I, col. 2.
17. §6.
8. § 8 (a).
ig. Section 8 (c)provides that the committee shall consider in formulating their
recommendations: "(I) competitive conditions as affected by transportation, living, and
production costs; (2) the wages established for work of like or comparable character
by collective labor agreements negotiated between employers and employees by representatives of their own choosing; and (3) the wages paid for work of like or comparable character by employers who voluntarily maintain minimum-wage standards in
the industry."
Section 13 provides that specified occupations shall be exempt from the operation
of §§ 6 and 7.
2o. §8 (d).
21. §7 (b) (I) (2) (3).
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child labor 22 has been employed within thirty days prior to the removal
of such products. The Administrator may make exceptions to the wage
rates in cases of learners, apprentices, and persons with impaired earning
capacity. 28 By Section 15 it is made unlawful to transport, deliver or sell
in commerce, or to ship, deliver, or sell with knowledge that shipment,
delivery or sale thereof in commerce is intended, any goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of Sections 6 or 7.
Furthermore, it is unlawful to violate any provisions of Sections 6 and 7, to
discharge or discriminate against any employee who has complained or
testified in any proceeding under the Act, to violate any provision of Section 12, or to violate any provision of Section ii (c).24
Section ii (a) grants to the Administrator or his representative power
to investigate and gather data regarding wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, and to enter and inspect such places and records,
and question such employees as he may deem necessary to determine
whether a violation of the Act has occurred or to secure information which
may aid in the enforcement of the Act. Section 9 provides for the compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers and
documents.
Section 18 provides that no provision of the Act shall excuse noncompliance with federal, state, or municipal regulations establishing higher
wage rates, shorter work weeks, or higher standards for employment of
child labor, thereby eliminating a potential supersedure problem. Section
19 provides that the invalidity of any provision shall not affect the remainder of the Act.
Constitutiondity

With the economic and social desirability of legislation such as the
Fair Labor Standards Act this article is concerned only in so far as it may
influence pertinent legal considerations and may affect the decisions
of
2
Of
those charged with the task of determining the validity of the Act.
immediate interest are the constitutional problems inherent in an act of
such breadth and far-reaching implications. It is conceivable that the
major problems can be conveniently classified into such categories as (I)
the commerce power, (2) due process of law, (3) delegation of power, and
(4) administrative powers of investigation.
i. THE COMMERCE POWER

It is axiomatic that the Federal Government is a government of
delegated powers. 26 Among the powers so delegated are those which have
22. Section 3 (I) defines "oppressive child labor" to mean the employment of children under sixteen except by their parents, or the employment of children between sixteen and eighteen in hazardous occupations.

23. § 14.

24. A violation of any provision of § I is punishable by a fine of not more than
$Io,ooo, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. However, no person
shall be imprisoned except for an offense committed after a prior conviction under
§ i6 (a). Employers violating §§ 6 and 7 are liable to their employees to the amount
of unpaid minimum wages, or unpaid overtime, and an additional amount as liquidated
damages.
The district courts are granted jurisdiction subject to the provisions in § 2o of the
Clayton Act to restrain violations of § 15. The text of the instant Act cites § 2o of the
Clayton Act as "U. S. C. A. I934 edition, title 28, § 381". This citation, however,
is § i7, and not § 2o.
25. The literature concerning such aspects of governmental regulation of hours,
wages and child labor is vast and controversial. An excellent bibliography can be
found in COMMONS AND ANDRaws, op. cit. mpra note i, at 535.
26. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. z, 187 (1824); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U. S. 542, 551 (1875).
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been construed as being embraced by the "commerce clause". 27' Congress
shall have power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The scope of the power
is defined and limited not merely by a construction of the language itself,
but by other provisions of the Constitution. 28 Hence, it must be remembered in any discussion of the commerce power that its unfettered exercise
is subject to many restraints, for example, the application of the due process
amendment. 29 It is by reason of this power of Congress to regulate commere among the several states that the Act under consideration must be
upheld, if at all. 80
Commerce is traffic and commercial intercourse and the power of
Congress accrues whenever that traffic and intercourse is interstate in
character.2 1 And this power to regulate is manifestly the power to "make
rules governing the conduct, legal interest and relationships of those engaged in interstate or foreign commerce." 832But the power of Congress
is not confined to persons and things actually engaged in commerce. It
may reach whatever directly affects commerce. 3 Moreover, commerce
has been likened unto a current so that Congress could regulate the affairs
of dealers in stockyards into and out of which products constantly moved
in interstate journey.3" Such words of art, however, can mean but little
when isolated from their particular applications. What is a "direct" effect?
When is an activity within the "current" of commerce? To a large degree
it is upon the Court's attitude with regard to these questions that the Act's
validity must depend. ,
The Act is designed to regulate the wages and hours not only of those
"engaged" in commerce, but those engaged in the production of goods for
commerce.3 5 In 1895 it was decided that commerce succeeds to manufacture,30 and in the more recent past the Court, determined to preserve our
dual form of government, and jealous of federal encroachment upon the
affairs of the state,3 7 has declared that the working conditions of those engaged in producing a commodity are local in nature.

In Carter v. Carter

Coal Co.,38 pronouncing the Guffey Coal Act 3 9 unconstitutional, such
relationships were held to have only an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, and not within the regulatory power of Congress. Scant support
for the validity of the present act can be found in the Carter decision.
Furthermore, in the Schechter case,40 the precise holding of which was

27. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
28. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330, 347 (935) ; GAVTr,
THE COmmERcE CLAUSE (1932) § 88; RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL PowER OvER
COMmERCE (1937) 167. Cf. Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (i9o8). But see

WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITuTIoNAi LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1929)
29. U. S. CoNsT. Amend. V. ". . . nor shall any person . . . be

1866.

deprived of

life, liberty, or property, Without due process of law ..
30. The Statute explicitly declares in § 2 (b) that Congress is acting through the
exercise of its power to regulate commerce. Throughout the Act, the unmistakable
implication is that Congress is employing its commerce power.
31. WILLIS, CONsTITuTIONAL LAW (1936) 288.
32. GAvrr, op. cit. supra note 28, § 84.
33. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
34. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 516 (1922) ; Swift & Co. v. United States,
196 U. S. 375 (19o).
35. §§ 6 and 7.
36. United States v. E. C. Knight & Co., I56 U. S. I (I895).
37. RIBBIX op. cit. supra note 28, at 233; Fraenkel ConstitutionalIssues in the Supreme Court, Z935 Term (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 27, 35.
38. 298 U. S.238 (1936).
39. BiTu mIOus CoAL CONSERVATION AcT, 49 STAT. 991, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 8O et
seq. (Supp. 1937).
40. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S.495 (I935).
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that the National Industrial Recovery Act

41

was unconstitutional because

of an invalid delegation of legislative power, the Supreme Court took pains
to point out that the hours and wages of those employed in slaughtering
42
and selling in local trade had no direct relation to interstate commerce.
In other words, the current of commerce had ended when products shipped
interstate had reached the hands of wholesale dealers in New York. Directness of effect, to the judicial mind of 1935, connoted some sort of a causal
proximity and the absence of an intervening agency. The extent of this
effect was immaterial. "If the production by one man of a single ton of
coal intended for interstate sale and shipment, and actually so sold and
shipped, affects interstate commerce indirectly, the effect does riot become
direct by multiplying the tonnage, or increasing the number of men employed . . ." 43 Such a mode of reasoning necessarily ignores the tremendous influences of low wages and its corollary, low purchasing power,
upon the volume of interstate movement.
A further obstacle remains. The year 1916 witnessed the enactment
of a statute 44 the provisions and language of which were almost identical
45
with those of the child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
In Hammer v. Dagenhart46 the statute was declared unconstitutional. The
question involved, as stated by the Court, was whether or not Congress,
in regulating commerce, possessed the authority to prohibit transportation
in interstate commerce of goods manufactured in a factory wherein child
labor had been employed. The Court concluded that the power to regulate
was the antithesis of the power to prevent commerce from moving, and
distinguished the White Slave and Lottery cases,47 in which prohibitions
were upheld, on the tenuous ground that in the latter, the use of interstate
transportation was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results,
while in the Child Labor decision such was not the case. It has been
pointed out that the specific acts incident to the white slave trade or lottery
business can only be performed in one state and that while harmful results
may be carried to a state by interstate transportation it is the transportation,
and not the harmful results which gives Congress jurisdiction. The
malignant effects created by the transportation are as present in one case
as in the other.48 Moreover, the Court declared that the regulation of the
production of articles, intended for interstate commerce, is a matter of
local concern. 49 Despite the brilliant dissent of justice Holmes demonstrating that "regulation means the prohibition of some thing," 1o the problem
has not been conclusively settled. 51 Thus, while the Supreme Court in the
past has been generous in permitting federal regulation where moral harm
was to be remedied, it has been reluctant to do so where the wrong was
41. 48 STAT. I95 (1933), i5 U. S. C. A. § 7o1 et seq. (Supp. 1937).

42. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 at 548 (1935). The
late Justice Cardozo concurring, goes so far as to suggest that had the wage and hour
provision involved been adopted by Congress rather than by the authorities designing
the code, they would nevertheless have been void. Id. at 554.
43. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 at 3o8 (1936).
44. 39 STAT. 675 (i96).
45. § 12.
46. 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
47. Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 (192) ; Champion v. Ames No. 2, 188
U. S.321 (1902).
48. GAvir, op. cit. supra note 28, at 235. See also RIBBLE op. cit. supra note 28, at
174. The logical ground for justifying the adverse decision would seem to lie in the
due process clause.
49. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 272 (1918).
5o. Id. at 277.
Si. See Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce, A Crucial Constitutional Issue (933) 18 CoRe. L. Q. 477.
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social. 52 It would thus appear that if hour and wage regulation by the
Federal Government is to be sustained by the use of a power to exclude
products from interstate commerce, the Dagenhart decision must be overruled."
Opponents of laissez-faire, however, can find comfort in an unmistakable change of attitude on the part of the Court. In Morehead v. New
York ex rel. Tipaldo," while an interstate commerce problem was not
involved, Justice Stone, in dissenting, pointed out that in recent years it
has become apparent that insufficient wages affect not only the worker,
but the entire economic system, and that the burden of solving the resultant problems of poverty, health and morals must rest on the nation
rather than on the individual.5 5 In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish5 8

and in Whitfield v. Ohio,5 ' the Court evidenced a clearer understanding of
the nature of economic harm as distinguished from inherent wrongfulness,
and was willing to take it into consideration.5
The Act, as it relates to wages and hours, does more than merely
prohibit the shipment of goods in interstate commerce. It is a punishable
offense to violate any of the wage or hour provisions of Sections 6 and 7In the past, by virtue of its power over commerce, Congress has prohibited
unfair methods of competition or acts tending toward monopoly.55 If Congress may do this, it might well be able to prevent the securing of an unfair
competitive advantage by means of oppressive labor conditions.8 0 If this
theory be accepted, a refusal to overrule the Dagenhart case, though seriously impeding the effectiveness of the Act, particularly Section 12, would
nevertheless leave intact the punitive features of Section 15 (2).
It is in the recent Labor Board cases 81 that proponents of the Fair
Labor Standards Act have found their greatest solace. It has been suggested that the present Act was drafted in accordance with the principles
therein enumerated.62 In three respects these cases have an important
bearing on the Act under discussion. First, a theory is presented under
52. WiLis, op. cit. supra note 3, at 343, n. 233. Cousens, The Use of the Federal Interstate Commerce Power to Regulate Matters Within the States (934) 21
VA. L. R.v. 51,

68.

53. WILIS, Op. cit. supra note 3I, at 920. The author suggests a distinction between the Child Labor Act and New Deal legislation in that child labor did not prevent the flow of goods in interstate commerce, while conditions causing the depression
did so obstruct its flow. Id. at 342. It may well be, however, that child labor conditions have a deleterious effect, as, for example, diminishing the flow of goods from
states prohibiting child labor because of the inability to compete, or diminishing the
flow of goods into the state where oppressive child labor exists because of a lower
purchasing power. The same economic results may well follow from low wages or
long hours.
54. 298 U. S. 587, 631 (936).
55. Id. at 635.

56. 3oo U. S. 379 (1936).
57. 297 U. S. 431 (2936).
58. Fraenkel, stpra note 37, at 47. THE SEcurITiEs Acr OF 1933, 48 STAT. 74
(Q933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77a et seq. (Supp. 1937), is a recent example of the exercise
of a Congressional power to prohibit interstate shipment.
59. SHERMAN ANTI-TRusT AcT, 26 STAT. 209 (189o), I5 U. S. C. A. § I et $eq.
(927) ; CLAYToN AcT, 38 STAT. 730 (94), 15 U. S. C. A. § 12 et seq. (1927) ; FEnE.RA. TRADE CommitsiIoN ACT, 38 STAT. 717 (914), I5 U. S. C. A. §41 et seq. (1927).
The Acts have been extensively construed. For a review of many of the cases, see
GAVIT, op. cit. stpra note 28, at § 75.
6o. See statement by former Assistant Attorney General Jackson in 81 CoNG. REC.
167o, 1671 (App. 1937).

61. The Labor Board cases consist of National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 3O U. S. I (1937); National Labor Relations Board v.
Fruchauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49 (937) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58 (1937).
62. H. R. REP. No. 1452, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) 9.
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which various provisions of Section 15 can be sustained as a valid exercise
of the commerce power. The Labor Board cases recognize that the power
to regulate commerce encompasses the power to adjust certain labor relations such as the right to organize and bargain collectively, which, unregulated, may lead to industrial warfare and which, in turn may burden interstate commerce. 63 It can scarcely be controverted that low wages, long
hours, and oppressive child labor have a like effect. Second, by its terms
the National Labor Relations Act, like the instant Act, purported only to
reach that which directly burdened or affected commerce. In answer to
the challenge that the Labor Relations Act was an attempt to regulate all
industry, invading the domain of the States, though disguised by colorable
references to interstate commerce, the Court, citing the familiar rule that
as between two possible interpretations, one rendering the act unconstitutional and the other constitutional, the latter is to be chosen, construed
the Act as designed to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority." Recent changes in the personnel of the Court indicate that it
will be at least as sympathetic with the present Act. Third, the Court
has subtilely, but unmistakably, redefined its concept of a "direct" effect
on interstate commerce since its decisions in the Schechter and Carter
cases. Under this definition both the validity of the application of the present
Act to wage and hour regulation of employees engaged in the "production
of goods for commerce . . ." 65 is strengthened and the possibility of an
effective and inclusive administration under the Act is immeasurably increased. Whether the Court has abandoned its view that the extent of the
"indirect effect" on interstate commerce is immaterial, or whether the Court
has merely broadened its concept of proximity in causal relationships is
not clear.6 6 In any event, the distinction between that which directly
affects commerce and that which does not is one of degree and must be
drawn in the individual case. 67 The problem would seem to involve, as in
the Labor Board cases, the determination of the question as to whether a
specific business, or industry is within reach of the Act, rather than the
constitutionality of the Act itself.
2. DuE PROCESS OF LAw
As previously indicated,6 s the power of Congress to regulate commerce is limited by the Fifth Amendment declaring inter alia that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." Any problem of due process in its substantive aspect involves a
balancing of the need for social control against individual liberty.69 In
striking this balance, the Court, in the past, has been wont to consider not
merely the capriciousness, or discrimination of the legislation at issue, as
63.

49 STAT. 449 (935), 29 U. S. C. A.
1937), is predicated upon the theory that the refusal of employers

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,

§ x51 et seq. (Supp.

to permit employees to organize and bargain collectively impairs the efficiency of instrumentalities of commerce, affects the flow of goods in commerce, and causes such a diminution of employment and wages as to disrupt the market for goods in commerce.
64. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S.
I, at 30 (1937).
65. §§ 6 and 7.
66. In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S.
1, 41 (1937) the Court stresses the seriousness of the effect on interstate commerce
which would be occasioned by strife in respondent's enterprise. Yet in the FriedmanHarry Marks case, 3oi U. S. 58 (i937), the insignificant size of respondent's business
called for no different decision. See Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence
Upon the Development of Collective Bargaining (1937) 50 H v. L. REv. IO71.
67. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 546 (i935) ; National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37 (i937).
68. Supra p. 94.
69. WnLis, op. cit. spra note 31, at 705.
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it would appear to the mind of the reasonable man, but also to judge the
constitutionality of the statute in question in the light of its particular
economic and social concepts and beliefs.70 Thus, in Lochner v. New
York, 71 it was more important to the court that freedom of the individual
and liberty to contract be protected than it was to overcome the economic
inequality of employer and employee and the health of the worker, by sustaining a regulation of hours. In Adkins v. Children/s Hospital,7 2 the
welfare of women workers weighed naught when contrasted with the same
personal liberty. Recent decisions supply a narrower definition of due
process, 7 3 and, moreover, indicate that the Court either has changed its
collective economic and social viewpoints, or else has denied their validity
as standards for testing the constitutionality of legislation 74 under the due
process clause. In any event, the Court still retains its ability to declare
legislation arbitrary and discriminatory however nebulous may be the
75
test.

Before the specific requirements of the instant Act can be tested by the
due process clause, it would seem pertinent to inquire whether the act
imposes both wage and hour regulations, or is merely a wage act. It
might be argued that the latter is the case in that no restriction is imposed
upon the actual number of hours worked but it is merely required that an
overtime rate be paid for hours in excess of the prescribed minimum.76 In
this respect, the so-called hour provisions can be distinguished from those
of the state hour law sustained in the Bunting v. Oregon 77 case. In the
latter act, overtime was limited to a maximum of three hours. Should
the validity of the argument be conceded, it would thus become necessary
to uphold the instant act purely as a wage regulation.
In Wilson v. New, 78 an act purportedly a regulation of hours, was
considered on the basis of its being a wage law, and upheld. However,
the peculiar circumstances of the case somewhat lessens its value as an
authority. Particularly, it was stressed that the failure of the parties
involved, railroads and their employees, to agree upon conditions of employment rendered possible Congressional regulation without deprivation
of freedom of contract, which normally, the tenor of the opinion seems to
indicate, would preclude wage regulation.
70. Id. at 723. However, this Court would scarcely admit that its opinion as to
social desirability prevails over that of the legislature. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S.
539, 547 (i9o8) ; O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251,
257 (1930).
71. i98 U. S. 45 (1905). The limitation of the Fifth Amendment on the Federal

Government is the same as that imposed by the Fourteenth on the power of the several

States. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1931) 392.
72. 261 U. S. 525 (1923), overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S.
379 (1936).
73. Especially the much-quoted definition enunciated by Roberts, J., in Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537 (1934). "And the guarantee of due process, as has often
been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,
and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained."
74. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537 (1934); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 399 (1936). The opinion has been expressed that while superficially the Court has seemed to abandon its use of its own economic and social prede-

lictions, in the future, it may resort to them should the occasion arise. White, Constitutional Protection of Liberty of Contract: Does It Still Exist? (1935) 83 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 425, 550.
75. Nebbia v. New York, 29r U. S. 502, 537 (i934) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 399 (1936).

76. § 7 (a).

77. 243 U. S. 426 (ixr6).
78. 243 U. S. 332 (1917).
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However, it would seem that the sanctity of freedom of contract has
been shaken, though at no time was it any more than a relative right.79
Thus, while the health of women workers was not a sufficient consideration
to override the doctrine in the Adkins case, it was sufficient in West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish.0 Moreover, it is now recognized that the state is interested in the economic welfare of its citizens, and that the doctrine of
freedom of contract under the due process clause must yield to the extent
necessary to protect this interest. 81 This recognition related to the states,
but, as far as due process is concerned, what is true of the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment, is true of Congress under the Fifth Amendment.'
For the moment, conceding to Congress a police power 8 3 under the
commerce clause to regulate wages for the purpose of removing obstructions to the flow of interstate commerce in the absence of a due process
clause, if due process is no longer an absolute barrier to the establishment
of minimum wage laws by a state employing its police power, the Federal
Government, in a similar exercise of its police power derived from the
commerce clause, should not find due process any more serious a barrier.8 4
Assuming that the instant Act does regulate hours, the same considerations should apply equally to such legislation, meaning merely that the
wage and hour provisions of the instant Act can not be arbitrary, discriminatory, or capricious. Economic thought would seem to indicate they
are not. 5
A possible due process objection might be taken to the exemptions
contained in Section 7 (b) and (c) and Section 13. While it is true that
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may not be
relied upon to prevent arbitrary discriminations in a federal statute, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the same result can be achieved under
the Fifth Amendment.88 Though broad discretion is no doubt permissible,
classification must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose of the
statute.88 It has thus been held that a state anti-trust statute exempting
agricultural products in the hands of the producer from the operation of
its provisions is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. 89 If it
then be considered that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
can be tantamount in effect to the equal protection clause, it would seem
possible to argue that certain exemptions of the instant Act render it objectionable in that they bear no relation to the purpose of the Act. Why,
79. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 523 (1934).
8o. 300 U. S.379 (1936).
81. Stone, J., dissenting, Morehead v. N. Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587, 631, 633
(1936) ; West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U. S.379, 399 (1936).
82. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 525 (1934); COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (4th ed. 1931) 392.
83. It is generally recognized today that the Federal Government is possessed of
a "police power". See Essert, What Is Meant by the Police Power? (1933) 12 NEB.
L. BULL.208.
84. If under this construction, the Court will not consider the prevention of economic harm as a valid subject of legislation, the remarks of Justice Holmes in Brooks
v. United States, 257 U. S.432, 436 (1925) seem pertinent. "Congress can regulate
interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty, or the spread of any evil or
harm to the people of other states from the state of origin. In doing this it is merely
exercising the police power, for the benefit of the public, within the field of interstate
commerce."
85. COMMONs AND ANDREWS, Op. cit. supra note I, at 58, 83; CUMMINS, Op. cit.
supra note I, at 570; Moulton and Leven, supra note 3, at 4.
86. Dent v. West Virginia, 124 U. S. 114, 123 (1889); McCray v. United States,
195 U. S. 27, 6I (19o4).
87. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S.553, 566 (193i).
88. Connoly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S.540, 56o (1902).
89. Ibid.
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for example, should employees engaged in agriculture, or the canning of
agricultural commodities, be exempted? 90 Or why should employees of
street or interurban railways be excluded from the operation of the Act?
Furthermore, Section 7 (b) excuses employees from compliance with the
hour provisions if the employment contract is certified by the National
Labor Relations Board. 9
The solution depends on whether, in view of
the policy of the Act to eliminate labor conditions which burden commerce,
such a classification is reasonable. From the very nature of the problem,
a categorical answer would seem impossible.

3.

DELEGATION OF POWER

There is no express constitutional requirement that the three great
powers of government, legislative, executive, and judicial, be exclusively
exercised by distinct branches of government. 92
The Constitution provides, however, that "All legislative powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." 93 From this,
from eighteenth century political philosophy, and from judicial dicta, 94 it
has been assumed that Congress cannot validly relinquish its legislative
powers to another arm of the government. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has been lenient with Congressional enactments 9 and until recently, 96 has never declared a statute unconstitutional on the ground of an
invalid delegation of power to a coordinate branch of the government. The
rule has come down that Congress may delegate to the executive branch
wide discretionary powers of administration provided it supplies a definite
standard as a guide to the administrative body. 97 As the Court said,
". ..
Congress may declare its will, and after fixing a primary standard,
devolve upon administrative officers the 'power to fill up the details' by
prescribing administrative rules and regulations." 98 Thus, the administrative regulation is to issue from, and not be independent of, the rule of
Congress. 99 The Pananu Refining Co.100 case was a landmark in that it
invalidated Section 9 (c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act 11 on
the ground of improper delegation. Beside pointing out that the section
prescribed no rules for the governance of the President's conduct, the
language of the decision indicates that the section also was defective in
that it requires no findings by the President as a condition to his action." 2
Whether the latter requirement, promulgated by an interesting dictum, is to
become one of the universal tests of validity remains an open question.
go. § 13.
9I. The delegation of power problem involved in this section, as well as in
§ i3 (a) (7), will be discussed in detail in a Note to appear in the December issue of the
REVIEW.
92. Lukens, The Delegation of Power-A Neglected Constitutional Question
(1935)

9 TEmp. L. Q. 367.

93. U. S. CoNsr., Art. I, § I.
94. WIrLs, op. cit. supra.note

3, at 137.
95. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (I9o4) ; United States v. Grimaud, 22o

U. S. 5o6 (igio); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77
(1932). Cowan, Federal Spending Power and Delegation (1937) 5 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 80g.
96. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 0935) ; Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (i935). Fraenkel, supra note 37, at 72.
97. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 5o6 (igio). Cowan, supra note 95, at 834.

98. United States v. Shreveport Grain and Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77, 85 (1932).
99. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LMITATI Ns (8th ed. 1927) 228.
ioo. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (935).
101. 48 STAT. 200 (933), 15 U. S. C. A. §709 (Supp. 1937).
102. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 415 (I935).
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In the dissenting opinion of that eminent jurist, the late Justice Cardozo,
V 3
it appeared to be totally unwarranted.
'
The Schechter case imposed the requirement of definiteness of subject
matter. 04 Thus, the statute at issue was invalidated inasmuch as there
was no adequate definition of the subject to which the codes were to be
addressed. "Fair competition" was deemed too vague a concept. In the
Carter case, a delegation to producers of coal to fix minimum wages for
their districts was considered "legislative delegation in its most obnoxious
form . . ." 105 and violative of due process. No new requirement, however, was added.
Accordingly, if it be assumed that the three requirements are to be
adhered to, a delegation to be valid must (i) provide sufficient standards
for the guidance of the delegatee, (2) require findings of fact on the part
of the delegatee, and (3) relate to a subject which is reasonably well
defined.
It would appear that the instant Act satisfies the requirement of a
sufficient standard. While power is granted to the Administrator to
promulgate wage orders on the advice of the industry committees, the
range of his discretion is limited. In the first place, it is circumscribed by
the terms of Section 6. Under Section 8, while he can order rates in
excess of the minimums required by Section 6 in order to carry out the
policy of the Act, he may not prescribe rates over forty cents an hour.
Moreover, in prescribing variations, the Administrator and the Industry
Committees may not set rates such as will substantially curtail employment
or give a competitive advantage to any group.10 6 In addition, the relevant
factors to be considered, such as regional differences, competitive conditions, and wages established by collective bargaining agreements, are prescribed by the Act. 10 7 The condemnation applied in the Carter case' 0 to
the producers groups who, under the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
of 1935, could establish wage and hour regulation for the whole industry
in their respective districts, would not seem to be applicable to the industry
committees established by the present Act. Here, there is no power given
to a majority to "regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority." 'o1 The
industry committees' powers are advisory in character and are without
effect unless approved by the Administrator." 0
The most difficult problem, however, arises from the necessity that the
Administrator group industrial concerns into industries. This power is
nowhere explicitly granted but is one which is essential to the operation of
the Act."'1 Because of the unsatisfactory nature of the definition of "industry" in Section 3 (h), the Administrator's classifications remain largely
uncontrolled. 1 12 Whether such a circumstance will render the Act, in this
respect, defective, is a moot question.
Before promulgating a wage order, the Administrator must find that
the recommendations of the committee on which it is based are made in
1o3. Id. at 444-448. The requirement has been seized upon by state courts. See
Holgate Bros. Co. v. Bashore, 2oo Atl. 672 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1938).
io4. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 530 (935).
105. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 311 (1936).

io6. § 8 (c).
i07. Ibid.

io8. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 311 (1936).
iog. Ibid.

iio. § 8 (d).
The Administrator must, however, approve the recommendations
provided they satisfy certain findings he is to make.
ii(. Industry committees are to recommend classification within an industry, under
§8 (c), and standards are provided. This would not seem to affect, however, the initial

classification of concerns into industries.
112. Section 8 (f) merely provides that wage orders shall define the industries, and
no rules of guidance appear.
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accordance with law and are supported by the evidence adduced at the
hearing. He must also take into consideration the factors enumerated in
Section 8 (c). n ' It would seem that these provisions satisfy the dictum
of the Panama case.
In definiteness of subject matter, the instant Act is immeasurably
superior to the National Industrial Recovery Act which laid down no rule,
but substituted in its place, a vague declaration of policy. 1 4 Fair competition had no concreteness of meaning. The instant Act, on the other hand,
embraces well-defined subjects-minimum wages, maximum hours, child
labor. Orders of the Administrator are to be directed toward the fulfillment of the legislative policy in these restricted fields. Here, there is no
"roving commission to inquire into evils and upon discovery, correct

them."

115

4. THE ADmINISTRATIVE POWER OF INVESTIGATION
Since it is a recognized function of administrative agencies to "fill up
the details" 116 of general Congressional regulation, such bodies, within
constitutional limitations, should be vested with powers coextensive with
the purposes for which they are created. In accordance with this principle, Section 9, though it may be deemed to be broader than a mere
bestowal of subpoena power," 7 at least effectually bestows that power "for
the purpose of any hearing or investigation provided for in this
Act . ."
115 upon the Administrator, the Chief of the Children's Bureau,
and the Industry Committees.
The principal hearings conducted by the Administrator and the Industry Committees will be those in aid of classifying industries and recommending and promulgating wage and hour orders. Those conducted by
the Chief of the Children's Bureau will principally relate to his determinations of what is oppressive child labor. All of these are legislative or
9
quasi-legislative functions 1-"
-the exercise of the power of application to
specific instances of the general provisions of the Act, ubiquitously termed
delegated legislative power. A constitutional question with regard to the
validity of the use of subpoena by an administrative body to enable it to
carry out its legislative function then arises by reason of the prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment.'12
113. § 8 (d).
114. Lukens, supra note 92, at 375.
115. Cardozo, concurring in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S.
495, 551 (1935).
116. United States v. Shreveport Grain and Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77, 85 (1932).
117. An ambiguity is caused by defining the powers therein granted by a reference
to similar powers found in the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the inclusion of
parentheses around the following phrase contained in such reference: ". . . relating
to the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers and documents."
The uncertainty is whether such parenthetical matter was meant to be merely descriptive or intended to restrict the powers granted under the present Act to summoning witnesses and requiring the production of books and papers. The latter construction would
appear to be meant for the following reasons: (a) the lack of any enforcement or inspection functions of the Industry Committees to justify, as to them, any reference to
the words "being investigated or proceeded against"; (b) the broader visitorial powers
granted by § ii; (c) the history of the bill in Congress revealing a similar legislative
intent. H. R. REP. No. 1452 (Committee Print), 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) 37;
(d) the only analogous use of parentheses in the Act in § 17, wherein the parenthetical
material is purely descriptive.
118. § 9.
1i9. Note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 8ig, 839.

120. No problem exists as to the Fifth Amendment. By incorporating § 9 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 722 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 49 (1927), the
Act provides for immunity against prosecution based upon revelations made before the
Administrator, the Industry Committees or the Chief of the Children's Bureau in
obedience to a subpcena. In Sherwin v. United States, 258 U. S. 399 (1925) it was

LEGISLATION

It has been suggested that the power of Congress to delegate its subpoena
power is to be measured by social necessity, and the increasing importance
of administrative units in the governmental set-up, provided that in each
particular instance the information or documents sought have a reasonable
relation to the matter under inquiry. 121 This would be an extension of
the present judicially accepted rule which permits the use of subpcena by
an administrative body only in its quasi-judicial capacity,122 but a well
merited one.
Since the power of subpoena extends to all hearings and investigations under the Act it should also be amenable to use by the Administrator
and the Chief of the Children's Bureau to enable them to discover violations of the Act and to aid in the enforcement of its provisions. Though
it be admitted that the use of the subpoena by administrative agencies may
be valid for quasi-judicial and legislative purposes, 23 their use in the
discovery of violations of the act presents a moot question.124 If they are
considered to be analogous to general warrants, their unconstitutionality
cannot be gainsaid. 25 Such an analogy, however, would be based on the
presumption that there exists no definite limits to their exercise. Therefore, any attempt to invest an administrative body with the power of subpcena for enforcement purposes is unconstitutional per se. However, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Administrator and the Chief of the
Children's Bureau have not the power "for the purpose of any hearing or
investigation provided for in this Act" to require compliance to their subpcenas. They must seek the aid of the proper District Court of the United
States.128 In this manner, judicial review of any subpcenas issued by the
Administrator or the Chief of the Children's Bureau in their attempts to
discover violations' of the Act is assured and the test of the reasonableness
of the demands and their relevancy to matters which might constitute a
violation of the Act are in each specific instance proper and sufficient safeguards against a violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable and unlawful searches and seizures. This should be no less
held this section will not afford immunity to information not given pursuant to a subpcena. Thus, no immunity is extended to the use of whatever visitorial powers are
granted under the Act. But see Note (935) 44 YALE L. J. 823 et seq. for the suggestion that no constitutional question is involved. See also Handler, Comtitutionality
of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commissions (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 708, 916,
n. 3; Langeluttig, ConstitutionalLimitations on Administrative Power of Investigation
(1934) 28 ILL. L. Rty. 5o8.
121. Handler, supra note 12o, at 9o5, 917, 933 et seq.; Langellutig, spra note 12o,
at 513 et seq.; Notes (1938) 86 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 42o, 428, (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 8ig,
839.
122. This is the rule of Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 211 U. S. 407
(Io8), which was generally followed by the courts in respect to other administrative
bodies. Federal Trade Comm. v. Smith, 34 F. (2d) 323 (S. D. N. Y. 1929). The only
departure which has been allowed, strangely enough, relates to the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Smith v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 245 U. S. 33 (I917), which is
considered as having overruled the Harriman case. Two recent federal lower court
cases have upheld a limited extension of this rule, permitting the use of subpcena to
compel the production of evidence when engaged in a fact-finding inquiry undertaken
pursuant to Congressional resolutions to acquire information for future legislation.
Federal Trade Comm. v. Millers' Nat. Fed., 47 F. (2d) 428 (App. D. C. 1931); Federal Trade Comm. v. National Biscuit Co., i8 F. Supp. 667 (S. D. N. Y. 1937). There
appear to be no quasi-judicial duties in the present Act.
123. See supra notes 121, 122.
124. Handler, supra note 12o, at 917; Langeluttig, supra note 12, at 517; Note
(1935) 44 YALE L. J. 819, 831.
125. Both Handler, supra note 12o, at 917, and Langeluttig, supra note 120, at 517,
suggest that for executive purposes subpoenas are like general warrants the prohibition
of which is the reason for the Fourth Amendment.
126. FEDERAL TRADE CommIsslOI AcT, 38 STAT. 722 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §49
(1928), as referred to in § 9 of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
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so than in the category embracing the use of subpcenas by administrative
bodies for quasi-legislative purposes, which it is generally felt should be
deemed valid.2 7 Therefore, in regard to the instant problem, the present
Act appears to violate no constitutional limitation.
However, for purposes of discovering violations and to aid in making
the enforcement of the Act more effective, and for these purposes alone,
Section ii makes a further contribution to the powers of investigation
of the Administrator and Chief of the Children's Bureau. This is the right
to enter and inspect all places and records deemed necessary to consummate
these purposes, so-called visitorial powers of investigation. 28 A refusal to
comply with a demand for access, however, would appear to successfully
halt this procedure. Such refusal to comply is not, as is Section II (c),
a prohibited act under Section 15, nor does Section ii contain any provision whereby the Administrator or Chief of the Children's Bureau can
12 9
obtain a court order to secure enforcement of their demands for access.
Therefore, Section ii, of itself, would afford no ground for constitutional
objection under the Fourth Amendment.
However, there exists the possibility of a constitutional problem if
Section 9 is so interpreted as to include all the investigatorial powers of
the Federal Trade Commission, that is, visitorial power, in addition to the
subpcena power already considered. In that event, means would be present
to obtain judicial sanctions to require compliance, as with the subpoena
power. In view of the Court's reluctance to admit that Congress intended
to grant such a power directly to the Federal Trade Commission,' 0 it
would seem that the Court would not resort to indirection to recognize the
bestowal of a possibly unconstitutional power. Congress, itself, has not
deemed it proper to implement its grant of visitorial powers with provisions for court enforcement thereof in other recent enactments.' 2 ' However, even though this interpretation be well received, since the exercise
of any such power to compel compliance requires application to the courts,
judicial review of the reasonableness of the demands and their relevancy
127. Similar powers of investigation to discover violations, at least through the use
of subpenas, are expressly granted to the Securities Exchange Commission in the
SECUmTIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, 48 STAT. 899 (934), I5 U. S. C. A. § 78u (Supp.
1937). The same is true of the FEDERAL PowER ACT, 49 STAT. 856 (I935), 16 U. S. C.
A. 825f (Supp. 1937). See Note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 8ig, 831, 832.
128. The courts have used the term "visitorial" in connection with inspection of

books and papers through the use of a subpcena. See Hale v. Henkel, 2o U. S. 43, 75
(io5) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 382 (igio) ; Hammond Packing Co.
v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 348 (I9O8). Commentators have used "visitorial" to denote
the right of access, i. e., to enter and inspect. Handler, SUpra note 120, at 918; Langeluttig, supra note 12o, at 319; Note (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 42o, 426, n. 45.
i29. The inclusion of this section apparently amounts to a mere expression by Congress of the cooperation it desires from business.
130. Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1923).
The Court, through Justice Holmes, held that the Federal Trade Commission had in
this case claimed an unlimited right of access to the respondents' papers to determine
the possible existence of practices in violation of fair trade regulations under § 9 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 722 (1914), i5 U. S. C. A. § 49 (1928).

The Court then refused to allow the claim, declaring that it could not believe Congress
intended to authorize direct fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility

that they might disclose evidence of a crime, and intimated that such an attempt would
have been unconstitutional.

131. SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, 48 STAT. 899, 901 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A.

§78u, w (Supp. 1937) ; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 49 STAT. 455 (1935), 29 U.
S. C. A. § I61 (Supp. 1937) ; MoTR CARRIER ACT oF 1935, -49 STAT. 563, 564 (1935),
49 U. S. C. A. §§ 32ob, 322b (Supp. 1937) ; FEDERAL PoWER Act, 49 STAT. 854, 86i
(i935), i6 U. S. C. A. § 825b, m.
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to matters which might constitute a violation of the Act would again seem
to be a sufficient safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures±sa
Conclusion
It should be manifest that within the space available, it has been impossible to analyze in detail the countless problems created by a statute of
such broad scope and vast implications as the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The purpose of this paper has been merely to suggest the major constitutional difficulties, the arguments pro and con, and the tendencies which
point to a solution one way or another. It would be most presumptuous
to forecast the ultimate disposition of the Court. The complexities of
social trends, which today are combatting traditional doctrines, render such
a prediction valueless.
H. A. L.*
Partnership Bankruptcy Under the Chandler Act
The inadequacy of the Bankruptcy Act of 18981 with regard to many
problems of partnership bankruptcy has long constituted a favorite topic
of legal comment. However, despite its many deficiencies, until recently,
the partnership provisions of the older Act had remained entirely un.
affected by legislative revision. Under such a state of affairs, among its
expressed objectives, the recently enacted Chandler Act 2 sets forth "to
provide a more workable partnership section" 8 in an effort to eliminate
the conflict and uncertainty surrounding the former condition of the law.,
The Act of 1898 generally has been credited with the introduction of
the entity theory of partnerships into the federal law of bankruptcy. 4 How-"
ever, due to its conflict with many of the substantive principles of partnership law in addition to the inequities to which it has given birth, legal
scholars have divided as to the desirability of a strict interpretation of the
former Act in accordance with the doctrine. Although it is not the purpose
of the instant discussion to review past entanglements, judicial and nonjudicial, over the applicability of the theory, it may be safely asserted that
in many of the more important aspects of the law of bankruptcy, the entity
doctrine has given ground to an application of the aggregate theory of
partnerships.
Apparently overestimating the strength of the theory under the older
enactment, the author of the present section, although conceding the many
illogicalities and inequities surrounding the doctrine, expresses the inten132. This would be consistent with the decision in the American Tobacco case
which did not invalidate all demands for access but only such comprehensive and indefinite demands as made there by the Federal Trade Commission.
* William H. Rivoir, Jr., a member of the Third Year Class, collaborated in the
writing of this article.
i. 3o STAT. 544 (i88), ir U. S. C. A. § 1 et seq. (1927).
2. Pub. L. No. 696, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 22, 3938).
3. H. R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (937) 3; SEN. Rs,. No. I916, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 3.
4. Section 5a provides that "a partnership . . . may be adjudged a bankrupt"
and § 5f stipulates that "the net proceeds of the partnership property shall be appropriated to the payment of the partnership debts, and the net proceeds of the individual
estate of each partner to the payment of his individual debts." Together, these provisions have been viewed as indoctrinating the entity theory of partnership into the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. However, a study of the legislative history of the Act fails
to reveal any evidence that its framers attached any importance to the form of words
employed. Hough, Some New Aspects of PartnershipBankruptcy Under the Act of.
x898 (19o8) 8 CoL L. REV. 599, 600. For an excellent discussion of the entity and
aggregate theories, see WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION
(1929) 29-140, 275-301.
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tion not to depart from the fundamental principles of the entity theory in
fear of upsetting a large volume of practical decisions predicated thereupon.5 However, we are assured that many of the difficulties surrounding
the doctrine should be removed by the present Act." With this in mind,
it is the purpose of this article to discuss the more significant partnership
problems arising under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 with particular view
to their respective solutions, if any, which have been effected by the long
awaited Chandler revision of 1938.
Procedural Revision
(a) Limited Partnerships:According to the provisions of the Act of
1898, for purposes of bankruptcy, a limited partner was treated as a corporation and was so defined by the Act.7 Viewing the limited partnership
as "essentially a general partnership", 8 the draftsman of the present section
felt that the subject should be dealt with completely in the partnership
section and, as a result, necessary changes to that effect have been inserted.
A limited partner now may be placed into bankruptcy and, where he is
insolvent and under an applicable state or federal statute has made himself
individually liable for any or all firm obligations, may be subjected to the
same burdens and benefits incident to the status of a general partner.9
Despite the close similarity which the draftsman believed to exist between
the two types of associations, the important distinguishing incidents of
limited partnerships have not been affected. Special partners still are
exempt from individual liability from firm debts; they have no authority
to act for the firm; and, their deaths cannot effect a dissolution of the
partnership. Furthermore, the Act expressly preserves the applicability
of state statutes governing the order of distributing the assets of the
association upon its dissolution. 0 In view of the infrequency of proceedings involving such associations, the fundamentally procedural changes
made by the Act, in this regard, are relatively unimportant.
(b) Filing a Petition in behalf of Firm by Unauthorized Partner:
Pursuant to Section 5b, a petition filed in behalf of a partnership by less
than all of the general partners must allege that the partnership is insolvent. In such a case, Section 18 provides for service on non-consenting
partners and the filing of answers controverting the allegation of insolvency. Prior to the present enactment, the Supreme Court had held
that such a petition could only be viewed as an involuntary one and, as
such, could not be sustained inasmuch as it was not filed by a creditor and
no act of bankruptcy had been alleged."
The effect of this decision was
5. Analysis of H. R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 21 (hereinafter referred
to simply as "Analysis").
6. Ibid.
7. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY AcT OF I898, § 1 (6).
8. Analysis, 22. Actually, the distinguishing aspects of the limited partnership are
marked especially with regard to the extent of individual liability, management and
transferability of interest. For a summary of the ordinary legal attributes of the two
types of associations, see FREY, CASES AND STATUTES ON BUSINESS ASSocIATIONS
(935) 1-3.
9. Section 5k provides: "If a limited partnership is adjudged bankrupt, any limited partner who is individually liable under the laws of the United States or of any
State for any of the partnership debts shall be deemed a general partner as to such
debts and, if he is insolvent, shall be subject to the provisions and entitled to the benefits of this Act, as in the case of a general partner."
io. § 5g.
iI. Meek v. Center County Banking Co., 268 U. S. 426 (1925). In In re York, 18
F. (2d) 428 (N. D. Tex. 1926), the facts are similar to those in the Meek case. Although the petition was treated as voluntary, the court held that a partner had no
authority to file such a petition for the firm inasmuch as this was equivalent to an assignment for the benefit of creditors which a partner is not authorized to make.

LEGISLATION

to require the consent of all the partners before a petition in behalf of the
firm could be upheld. Where such a petition is opposed by other partners,
it is evident that it cannot be considered a voluntary one. Furthermore,
viewed as involuntary, previous objections again may be raised. Under
these circumstances, the present provision appears as a compromise between opposing difficulties. The petition is considered so far involuntary
as to necessitate an allegation of insolvency but so far voluntary as to
obviate the necessity of an act of bankruptcy. 12 Whatever advantages are
secured to the individual partner by the unified administration obtained,
it is evident that his interests were just as well protected under the former
state of the law. Upon proper scheduling of firm assets and debts, his
individual discharge relieved him from further responsibility for firm
obligations and the opportunity for seeking a dissolution of the firm in
equity was always open in the appropriate state tribunal.' 3 However, the
procedural benefits of the present provision may well justify the revision
which has been effected.
(c) Joint Petitions-Several Fees: The Act of 1898 was silent on
the question as to whether a joint petition might be filed by or against the
partnership and one or more of the individual partners. As a result, courts
disagreed as to which constituted the proper procedure. Several courts,
strictly adhering to the entity theory supposedly indoctrinated into the
former Act, steadfastly denied the right to a joint petition; 14 others readily
permitted a single petition.15 Adopting the latter practice as the preferable
one,16 the7 Chandler Act expressly provides for the right to file a joint
petition.1

A correlated problem is whether the trustee, referee and clerk are
entitled to one or more fees upon the filing of a petition for the adjudication
of both the firm and one or more of the partners. The old Act provided
for various fees to which trustee 18 and referee 19 were entitled upon the
filing of the petition in each case and those which were payable to clerks
for services to each estate.20 Furthermore, it stipulated that the clerk
should collect the fees of all in each case.2 ' Confusion resulted in the federal courts as to the proper interpretation of the provisions involved. On
the one hand, it was held that the filing of a petition praying for the adjudication of both firm and partners was the institution of a case which
involved several estates. As a result, the court declared that only the clerk
was entitled to several fees. 22 Other courts have rejected this proposal
as both unsound and inequitable. 23 Pointing to the use of the word case in
the clause authorizing the clerk to collect fees for himself in addition to
the others, these courts have refused to give any significance to the distinction raised. Furthermore, it has been suggested that since the labors.
12. Analysis, 23.
13. In general, see Notes (1927) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 85, (1925) 4 Tzx. L. REv.
102.

14. In re Barden, iol Fed. 553 (E. D. N. C. 1goo) ; In re Farley, 115 Fed. 359
(W. D. Va. 19o2).
15. It re Gay, 98 Fed. 870 (D. N. H. 1899) ; cf. It re Langslow, 98 Fed. 869 (N.
D. N. Y. 1899).
16. Analysis, 23.
17. § 5b.
18. NATIOxAL BANKRupTCY AcT OF 1898, § 48a.
1g. Id. §4oa.
20. Id. § 52a.
21. Id. § 5ia (2).
22. Willis v. Hart, ii F. (2d) 530 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926).
23. In re Thompson, 17 F. (2d) 6oi (D. N. H. 1927) ; In re Wenz, 30 F. (2d) 705
(M. D. Pa. 1929).

io8

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

of the referee and trustee are greater than that of the
clerk, the former, if
24
any, should be entitled to the greater compensation.
The present Act makes no change in the provision relating to the
treferee although expressly inserting the word estate in that relating to the
trustee.2
The express purpose of the latter revision is to overcome the
holding that the trustee is entitled to only one fee.28 Although probably a
result of inadvertence, it is possible that some courts may seize this as an
opportunity to deny referees, already well compensated, any right to further
remuneration. However, a more reasonable rule would allow several fees
where several adjudications are 2 7sought and, it is believed, the majority of
courts will continue so to hold.
(d) Automatic Adjudication of Partnership: By the provisions of

Section 5 i, where all the general partners individually are adjudged bankrupt, the partnership entity, without further petition, is also so adjudicated.
According to the author of the provision, this automatic adjudication carries
to its logical conclusion a related stipulation in Section 5d providing that
a court which first acquires jurisdiction over a general partner may have
jurisdiction of all the general partners and of the administration of the
partnership and individual property. 8 However, pursuant to General
Order VI, in cases of convenience, the court may transfer the case to
another jurisdiction. Thus, the spectacle of a non-adjudicated partnership
composed of members all of whom have been individually adjudicated, no
longer remains to haunt the exponents of the entity doctrine. By a logical
application of the aggregate theory, the present provision removes a useless obstacle to needed simplification of procedure in partnership bankruptcy.
Administration of Partnershipand Individual Estates
(a) Administering Estate of Non-Adjudicated Partner: With the

decision in Francisv. McNeal,29 it became firmly established that the trustee of the bankrupt partnership might administer the estates of both the
bankrupt firm and the individual non-adjudicated partners. However,
the logic of the doctrine has not gone unchallenged. Although it may be
at least jointly liable for firm debts, the estate of the individual partner is
not partnership property but the property of a non-adjudicated person.
It is evident that for a court to have jurisdiction over such assets, they
should belong to the bankrupt. The mere incident that the debts of the
'firm are also the debts of the individual partners should not confer jurisdiction over the property of a non-adjudicated partner any more than the
bankruptcy of an ordinary joint debtor should authorize the administration
of the personal estates of his non-bankrupt codebtors. 30 Furthermore, it
has been held that the estate of a partner chiefly engaged in an exempt
24. In re Thompson, 17 F. (2d) 6oi, 602 (D. N. H. 1927).
§ 48 (4) c.
26. Analysis, 165.
27. See, in general, Cook, Partnershipsin Bankruptcy (1930) 15
25.

ST.

Louis L. REV.

209, 218.

28. Analysis, 25.

29. 228 U. S. 695 (1913).
Earlier cases substantially in accord are: Dickas v.
Barnes, 14o Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o5) ; In re Stokes, io6 Fed. 312 (E. D. Pa.
i9oi) ; In re Lattimer, 174 Fed. 824 (E. D. Pa. i9o9). Contra: In re Bertenshaw,
157 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907). See Note (1912) io MIcH. L. REv. 215. Later
decisions following the instant holding are: Armstrong v. Fisher, 224 Fed. 97 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1915) ; Carter v. Whisler, 275 Fed. 743 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921) ; In re Hansley
& Adams, 228 Fed. 564 (S. D. Cal. 1916) ; cf. In re Sitnek, 52 F. (2d) 861 (W. D. Pa.
1931).
30. For an excellent analysis of the instant problem, see Brannan, The Separate
Estates of Non-Bankrupt Partnersin the Bankruptcy of a PartnershipUnder the Bankrupt Act of 1898 (i9o7) 2o HAuv. L. REV. 589. See also Note (1928) 41 HAv. L.
REV. lo44.
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occupation nevertheless may be administered under the rule in Francisv.
McNeal."' Although the Bankruptcy Act declares that such persons
should not be made involuntary bankrupts, 2 it is apparent that many of
the burdens of bankruptcy thus are imposed. However, these strong technical objections have been tempered by the many advantages incident to
a simplified joint administration and its resultant elimination of unnecessary delay in the satisfaction of creditor claims.
Despite its conclusive appearance, the decision in the McNeal case
left unanswered many problems of significance. As a result, much speculation has arisen as to the exact scope of the doctrine pronounced in that
case. Limited to its exact facts, the holding only purported to draw into
administration the estate of an insolvent partner. 83 However, later dicta
have interpreted the rule as extending to cases of solvent partners.3 4
Although the broad language of the McNeal opinion would warrant such
an interpretation, no decisive holding has since arisen. A more troublesome problem involves the nature of the power vested in the trustee. More
specifically, is it purely optional with the trustee whether or not to administer the separate estates of the partners or can partnership creditors
compel such administration over his objection? Further, is the duty
mandatory even in the absence of any desire on the part of the trustee or
partnership creditors for such an administration? 35 In view of the close
adherence of the court to the aggregate theory, it has been suggested that
had the question arisen in the McNegl case, the Supreme Court would
have held the duty to be mandatory.3 6 A further question emerges with
regard to the rights of the non-adjudicated partner and the individual
creditors in the administration of the individual estate. After determining
the extent of their interests in the individual assets, may separate creditors
demand a distribution of the agreed portion to the satisfaction of their
claims or may the non-adjudicated partner demand that this fund be totally
exempt from trustee interference? In the latter case, after determining
the surplus to which joint partnership creditors are entitled, if possible
without a liquidation, the remainder would revert to the partner instead
of being distributed among individual obligees 7 In view of the fact that
the individual never has been adjudicated, the latter would appear to be
the preferable solution. However, no holdings have been found involving
the foregoing problems and, consequently, they have been left open to
debate.
31. In -reDuke & Son, i99 Fed. 199 (N. D. Ga. 1912), 1I Micir. L. REv. 246 (1913)

[following the Circuit Court holding in Francis v. McNeal, 186 Fed. 481 (C. C. A. 3d,
I9i) ].
32. §4b.
33. See Note (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 134, 1136-1137.
34. See In re Hurley Mercantile Co., 56 F. (2d) 1023, 1025 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932).
Instances of a bankrupt firm containing a solvent partner or partners are rare. However, they may occur under § 3a (4) providing for an assignment by the firm for the
benefit of its creditors and under § 5b permitting a voluntary petition by the firm. In
both cases, the insolvency of the firm is not an issue. However, in the former situation, it would be very unlikely that a solvent partner would consent to such an assignment.
35. Cf. Abbott v. Anderson, 265 Ill. 285, io6 N. E. 782 (1914), discussed infra
note 62, holding that the failure of the trustee to administer the individual estates of
the non-adjudicated partners would not prevent a discharge of the latter from their individual liabilities for firm debts once the firm was discharged. This decision has been
viewed as forcing ". . . the creditor to have the partner's assets drawn into administration if he wishes to realize anything upon the individual liability of the partner"

thus suggesting that the firm creditors may control the discretion of the trustee. See
Note (1924) 37 H.Av. L. Rxv. 614, 616.
36. See supra note 33, at 137.
37. See Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. Rw. 1044, 1047.
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It is apparent that legislative clarification might have removed many
potential sources of confusion and uncertainty.
Unfortunately, the
Chandler Act makes no changes in the former statute with respect to the
instant problems and, as a result, final solutions must await the slower
functioning of the judicial process.
(b) Marshallingand Distributingthe Assets: Again, with respect to
the distribution of joint and several assets among the various claimants
thereto, the Chandler Act makes no substantial change. Thus, the restatement of the equity rules governing the marshalling of partnership assets
is left intact.8 8 The priority granted individual obligees in the satisfaction
of their claims out of the separate estate of the partner has been criticized
as conflicting with the principle that individual partners are liable in solido
for the joint obligations of the firm. 9 In view of this, it has been suggested that such firm creditors be permitted to share equally with individual
creditors in the distribution of the separate estates. 40 Whatever may be
the logic of this contention, the present provision generally has been regarded as a practical and just method of apportioning the interests of the
various creditors in the partner's individual estate.
By extending the applicability of Section 5 to include the limited
partnership, a minor modification of the instant provisions was necessitated.
As a result, provision has been made for distributing the final surplus, if
any, among the limited partners in proportion to their respective interests
and, more specifically, "in the order of distribution provided by the laws
of the state applicable thereto". 41 It should be noted that the latter clause,
made applicable also to the ordinary general partnership, may result in an
order of distribution different from that of the common law where state law
conflicts.
(c) Separate Trustees: By the provisions of Section 5c, partnership
creditors are accorded the privilege of appointing a trustee who also shall
be the trustee of the individual estate of any partner being administered
in the bankruptcy proceedings. However, where cause therefor is shown,
individual creditors of an adjudicated partner may be permitted by the
court to appoint their separate trustee for his estate. Prior to the Chandler
revision, the broad language of the former provision seemingly permitted
firm creditors to determine the identity of the trustee irrespective of whether
the proceedings were joint or separate, whether or not the partnership was
adjudicated, regardless of the existence of assets in either estate, and, in
general, appeared totally to deny separate creditors a voice in his selection. 42 Decisions involving interpretations of the former Act have been
few but, for the most part, have departed from a literal application of its
terms. Thus, it has been held that the older provision applied only to
joint proceedings involving the adjudication of both the firm and its members in their separate capacities. 4 3 Where individual assets were insufficient to satisfy individual obligations, the court held that the separate
creditors of a partner adjudicated several months after the firm adjudication, might elect a separate trustee.44 Under these circumstances, the court
declared that partnership creditors could have no possible interest in the
administration of the separate estate.4 5 Furthermore, it has been held that
38. § 5g.
39. Brannan, supra note 30, at 591-4.
4o. Ibid.; see also Note (1928) 14 VA. L. REv. 644, 646.
41. § 5g.
42. NATIoNAL BANKRUpTcY AcT oF x898, § 5b provided: "The creditors of the
partnership shall appoint the trustee; in other respects so far as possible, the estate shall
be administered as herein provided for other estates."
43. In re Beck, iio Fed. i4o (D. Mass. i9oi).
44. In re Wood, 248 Fed. 246 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
45. Id. at 25o.
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III

the former section did not provide for the displacement of a trustee regularly elected in individual proceedings, by a trustee appointed after a subsequent partnership adjudication. 48 In general, while recognizing that the
ordinary procedure contemplated by the old Act was an administration
of both estates by the partnership trustee, most courts engrafted upon this
the doctrine that where the necessities of the situation required, a court of
appropriate jurisdiction had
a discretionary power to permit the appoint47
ment of a separate trustee.

The present provision literally adopts the judicial interpretations of
the former section. However, prerequisite to the prerogative granted firm
creditors is the prior adjudication of the partnership. On the other hand,
the non-adjudication of the individual partner is ineffectual to prevent an
administration of his estate by a trustee so appointed. However, it should
be noted that even where special circumstances are shown for the selection
of a separate trustee, a prior adjudication of the individual partner is required before his appointment can be authorized. 4
Circumstances regarded as sufficient to remove a case from the ordinary application of the Act are exemplified by the holdings interpreting
the former provision. In general, such a situation would arise where the
assets of the separate estate have so far been depleted that firm creditors
could have no possible concern therein 49 or where the interests of the
various estates were in substantial conflict. 0 In the absence of such circumstances, the rule providing for a single trustee seems justifiable in the
interests of a unified and orderly administration of both estates.
Discharge
(a) Individual Partner'sLiability for Firm Debts after Discharge of
Partnership:5 Under the provisions of Section 5 j, the discharge of a
partnership in bankruptcy will not affect the liability of the individual general partner for debts of the firm. The Act of 1898 was silent on the
point and previous to the enactment of the present provision, confusion
characterized the status of the case law on the subject.5 2 In the absence
of a Supreme Court ruling 53 or a satisfactory federal court holding on
46. It re Deadwyler, 292 Fed. 5io (N. D. Ga. 1923).
47. It re Currie, 197 Fed. 1012 (E. D. Mich. igio); In re Wood, 248 Fed. 246
(C. C. A. 6th, 1918). Contra: In re Coe, 154 Fed. 162 (S. D. N. Y. 19o7).
48. See Analysis at 24.
49. See In re Wood, 248 Fed. 246, 25o (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
50. It re Currie, 197 Fed. 12 (E. D. Mich. igio).
51. The instant discussion is confined to the discharge of general partners inasmuch
as the problem ordinarily does not arise in the case of the restricted liability of the limited partner which more closely resembles that of a shareholder in an incorporated
association. See CRANE, PARTNERSHIP (1938) § 26; Note (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 895.
52. For discharge: Abbott v. Anderson, 265 Ill. 285, io6 N. E. 782 (1914) (discharge after firm composition) ; Nashville Saddery Co. v. Green, 127 Miss. 98, 89 So.
816 (1921) (discharge after firm composition) ; cf. Armstrong v. Norris, 247 Fed. 253
(C. C. A. 8th, 1917) ; see Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695, 701 (1913). Against discharge: It re Hale, 107 Fed. 432 (E. D. N. C. 19Ol) ; Ii re Pincus, 147 Fed. 621
(S. D. N. Y. i9o6) ; In re Coe, 183 Fed. 745 (C. C. A. 2d, 191o) (firm composition;
discharge denied for several liability in tort) ; Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Ford, 146 Ark.
227, 225 S. W. 320 (1920) ; Curlee Clothing Co. v. Hamm, i6o Ark. 483, 254 S. W.
818 (1923); Bloyd v. Williams-Echol Dry Goods Co., 167 Ark. 644, 268 S. W. 618
(1925) ; Ellet-Kendall Shoe Co. v. Miller, 95 Okla. 270, 215 Pac. 417 (1923) ; cf. In re
Neyland & McKeithen, 184 Fed. 144 (S. D. Miss. 19io) ; Rowland v. Lovett, 45 Ga.
App. 123, 163 S. E. 511 (1932) ; see In re Bertenshaw, 157 Fed. 363, 369 (C. C. A.
8th, 1907).

53. In Myers v. International Trust Co., 273 U. S. 38o (1927) (partnership discharge after a composition with firm creditors held not to release partner from special
liability assumed for firm debts) the court expressly refused to answer the principal
question treating it as still an open one.
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the problem, 54 legal writers speculated on an eventual judicial solution to
the question.55 With the decision of Francis v. McNeal"8 the problem
took on a more vexing nature inasmuch as it now became indubitable that
the trustee of the bankrupt partnership might administer both the firm
and individual partner's estates in the interests of the firm creditors. Prior
decisions denying a discharge had emphasized the fact that only partnership assets were involved in the previous bankruptcy proceedings and that
a discharge would deprive a firm creditor of his common law right to look
to the individual estates of the member partners for satisfaction of his
claims.57 Referring to the instant problem, Justice Holmes in the McNeal
case stated that a necessary sequence to the decision in that case was to
release the individual partner from his liability for firm obligations. 5
Instead of calming the troubled waters, this dictum of an eminent jurist
merely served to strengthen the controversy already raging.
In view of the compelling arguments in favor of discharging the individual partner, it is unfortunate that the author of the present section saw
fit to codify the more inequitable interpretations of the old Act. Although
conceding that "an entirely satisfactory solution to this problem is difficult",55 in justification of the present revision, the draftsman declared that
". .. an (individual) adjudication is a necessary prerequisite to an
application for discharge" 11 and that the instant provision was
. .
merely declaratory of existing law". 61 However, a careful examination of
the cases would appear to negative the latter conclusion and to cast doubt
upon the total validity of the former assertion. The holdings prior to the
McN eal case ought not to be considered too seriously inasmuch as the
doctrine of administering both estates had not yet attained authoritative
recognition. Once the individual assets of the partners are subjected to
the burdens of administration, a serious objection to an individual discharge for the joint debts of the firm is removed. Unfortunately, no case
has been found subsequent to the McNeal decision involving a state of
facts where a court, in granting or denying a discharge, was faced with
the problem of a previous administration of both estates by the trustee in
bankruptcy. Therefore, one could only speculate as to what a court would
decide had such a factual situation existed. 62 Even under these circumstances, the decisions were not in harmony. Since the McNeal case there
has been no square holding in the federal courts on the question and the
conflicting state decisions present inconsistent statements of the law. 63 In
favor of denying a discharge it has been argued that the Bankruptcy Act
54. The federal holdings cited supra note 52 were decided before the decision of
Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695 (913) which discarded the premise upon which
they were predicated.
55. See, in particular, Cook, .rupranote 27. See also Notes (1922) 22 Co. L. R'v.
348, 349, (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 1134, 1138.
56. 228 U. S.695 (1913).
57. In re Hale, 1O7 Fed. 432, 433 (E. D. N. C. i9oi) ; In re Pincus, 147 Fed. 621,
625 (S.D. N. Y. i9o6) ; see It re Bertenshaw, 157 Fed. 363, 369 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o7).
58. 228 U. S. 695, 701 (1913).
59. Analysis, 22.
6o. Id. at 26.
61. Id. at 27.
62. In Abbott v. Anderson, 265 Ill.
285, io6 N. E. 782 (1914), firm creditors instead of having the individual estates of the partners brought into administration,
accepted an offer of a firm composition under what the court termed "a mistaken view"
of the law that they could hold the individual partners liable for the balance of their
claims. It was held that inasmuch as the individual assets might have been brought into
administration, the individual partners were discharged from their separate liabilities

for firm debts. The Illinois court thus refuses to give any significance to the factual
distinction where the legal right to a joint administration exists.
63. See supra note 52.
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makes no provision for the discharge of non-adjudicated persons.6
Furthermore, according to the entity theory, the adjudication of the firm
is a proceeding in which the individual partners have had no part. 65 In
addition, it is suggested that the individual can always protect himself by
securing a discharge after being adjudicated in voluntary proceedings. 66
However, several courts have refused to recognize these contentions as
grounds for deciding that a non-adjudicated partner cannot be discharged
at least from his firm debts inasmuch as the partnership, of which he was
a member, has already been adjudicated. 67 Moreover, it is evident that
the individual partner may be wholly involved in a firm proceeding if the
trustee chooses to administer his individual estate. Furthermore, the
alternative of assuming the burdens of voluntary proceedings in bankruptcy
cannot be offered as a satisfactory reason for denying a discharge in this
instance.
Prior to the present enactment, various solutions were offered in an
effort to bring order out of chaos. Among them, on the authority of In re
Coe,6 s it has been suggested that a distinction should be made between the
liabilities of a partner arising out of firm contracts and those having their
sources in tort. In support of this classification, it is argued that inasmuch
as the contractual obligations of a partner are joint while his delictual
liabilities are, in addition, several, the discharge of the firm should only
operate to absolve the partner from further responsibility for debts arising
out of contract.69 Unfortunately, the flaws in such a proposal are apparent. First, the distinction between contract and tort no longer furnishes
a universal dividing line between obligations recognized as joint and those
accorded the status of joint and several. As a result of statutory modifications, many states now recognize both types of liabilities as joint and
several. 70 However, in those jurisdictions where the common law rule
remains unmodified, the proposal is subject to a second objection. The
principle is fundamental that a partnership creditor may seek satisfaction
out of the individual assets of a partner after reducing his claim to a
judgment. 71 Under the present suggestion, should the trustee fail to
administer the individual estates, partnership creditors would be deprived
of their interests in an important fund. It is apparent that the panacea has
not yet been attained.
A more equitable solution to the present difficulty would subject the
7
principle of discharge to the application of the rule of Francisv. McNeal. 2
Adopting a hypothetical attitude in view of the uncertainty of the doctrine,
if the trustee has brought into administration the individual estates, few
reasons for denying a discharge can be apprehended. This is especially
true in cases of obligations purely joint in nature. In this situation, inasmuch as firm creditors already have had full opportunities to secure due
64. In re Pincus, 147 Fed. 621, 625 (S. D. N. Y. i9o6) ; Curlee Clothing Co. v.

Harem, i6o Ark. 483, 486, 254 S. W. 88, 8ig (1923) ; Bloyd v. Williams-Echol Dry
Goods Co., i67 Ark. 644, 647, 268 S. W. 618, 61g (1925). For a discussion of this
point, see Notes (927) 5 TEx. L. Ray. 400, 402, (933) ig VA. L. Rav. 501, 502.
65. In re Hale, 1o7 Fed. 432, 433 (E. D. N. C. igoi) ; see WiatmFI, op. cit. mutpra
note 4, c. 4.
66. See Note (1924) 37 HARv. L. Ray. 614-615.
67. Abbott v. Anderson, 265 Ill. 285, io6 N. E. 782 (1914) ; Nashville Saddlery
Co. v. Green, 127 Miss. 98, 89 So. 816 (1921) ; cf. Armstrong v. Norris, 247 Fed. 253
(C. C. A. 8th, 1917) ; see Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695, 701 (1913).
68. 183 Fed. 745 (C. C. A. 2d, igio).
69. Note (933) Ig VA. L. Ry. 501, 502-503.
7o. For an excellent analytical discussion of this problem, see Burdick, Joint and
Several Liability of Partners (1911) 11 COL. L. RrV. 1o1.
71. MECHEm, PARTxzRsnP (2d ed. 1920) § 313.
72. See Cook, supra note 27, at 226-227; Note (1926) 5 TEx. L. Rav. 400, 401-402.

114

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

satisfaction of such debts of the individual partner in the joint administration of both estates, it is apparent that, as to them, the same result has been
obtained as if the bankruptcy proceedings, in addition, had been directed
against the partner in his separate capacity. Under these circumstances,
there should be no objection to discharging the partner. In the case of a
debt both joint and several, another qualification should be made. Since
such debts are also the individual debts of a partner 7 such partnership
creditors should be permitted to share pari passu with other individual
creditors of the same class in obtaining satisfaction of their claims out of
the individual assets. If the application of the rule of the McNeal case
has involved the distribution of the individual partner's estate to the satisfaction of claims of both groups of creditors, 74 it is submitted that the discharge of the individual should be a complete one involving a release from
both types of obligations irrespective of the technical objection that the
partner, as an individual, has not been adjudicated. In any event, even
in the absence of the distribution of that portion of the separate estate to
which individual obligees may be entitled,75 it is at least clear that a discharge from the joint firm obligations of the partner should be effected.
In enacting a rigid rule of no discharge, the present revision apparently will have the practical effect of forcing the individual member to
seek protection in the less desired form of adjudication under voluntary
proceedings. A failure to undergo such a procedure, consciously or unconsciously, will result in the possibility of having one's entire estate
depleted for the purpose of satisfying creditors of both types and yet remain saddled with personal liability for unsatisfied portions of old debts.
Such a result cannot be harmonized with an important purpose of the law
relating to the administration of debtors' estates, namely, discharge of the
debtor from existing obligations after such administration.7 6 To avoid
numerous inequities made possible by the Chandler Act, it is evident that
further revision is necessary.
(b) Individual Partner's Liability for Firm Debts after Individal
Adjudication and Discharge: Section 5j provides that "a general partner
adjudged a bankrupt either in a joint or separate proceeding may
obtain a discharge from both his partnership and individual debts". Although the instant provision represents the overwhelming weight of authority prior to the present revision 7 7 it was believed that an express'statement in the Chandler Act would be necessary in order to eliminate entirely
73. Partnership creditors holding joint and several obligations are entitled to share
equally with exclusively individual creditors in the distribution of the individual estates
of the partners. 6 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1937) § 2917 and cases cited
therein. In a few states it has been 'held that statutes making joint debts both joint
and several were not intended to introduce a new rule for marshalling assets as to
statutory several obligations and that the equitable priorities of partnership and individual creditors remain intact. Hundley v. Farris, lO3 Mo. 78, 15 S. W. 312 (I89);
see Hawkins v. Mahoney, 71 Minn. 155, 164, 73 N. W. 72o, 722 (i8g8).
74. The "groups" referred to include (a) holders of obligations merely joint in
nature and (b) holders of obligations either exclusively several or both joint and
several.
75. "Individual obligees" as used here include holders of obligations either exclusively several or both joint and several.
76. 1 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (13th ed. 1923) 477-478; Notes (1927) 5 TEX. L.
REv. 400, 404, (1933) ig VA. L. REv. 5O, 5o2, n. io.
77. Jarecki Mfg. Co. v. McElwaine, 1O7 Fed. 249 (C. C. Ind. 19Ol) ; I re Kaufman, 136 Fed. 262 (E. D. N. Y. 1905); In re Diamond, 149 Fed. 407 (C. C. A.
2d, i9o6); Gordon v. Texas Co., 119 Me. 49, 1O9 Atl. 368 (1920) ; City Nat. Bank of
Decatur v. Greene, 279 S. W. 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). Contra: In re Meyers, 97
Fed. 757 (S. D. N. Y. 1899); Dodge v. Kaufman, 46 Misc. 248, 91 N. Y. Supp. 727
(Sup. Ct. 1905) (Scott, J., concurring on ground that no proper foundation had been
laid).
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the slight conflict existing in the case law.78 Isolated decisions had held
that the discharge of a partner in separate proceedings would not release
79
his liability for partnership debts where joint assets were in existence.
However, the almost universal rule recognized that if partnership debts
and assets were properly scheduled in the individual proceedings and firm
creditors notified thereof, thus laying a "proper foundation", a discharge
granted to the individual partner would effect his discharge from further
responsibility for firm obligations. s0 Although the instant section is silent
on the question of a "proper foundation", it would seem clear that, under
Section 17 (3), a failure to meet these requirements will exempt the particular firm debt from the operation of the discharge provisions of the Act
unless it can be shown that the creditor involved had actual notice of the
proceedings.
The validity of granting a discharge after the adjudication of the individual partner appears to be indisputable.,
The statute purports to discharge the bankrupt from all provable claims and makes no provision for a2
discharge relieving him merely from one of several classes of debts.
Furthermore, the bankruptcy of the partner automatically effects a dissolution of the firm 83 and solvent partners are compelled by the Act either to
settle the partnership business themselves and to account for the interest
of the partner adjudicated or to have the partnership property administered
in bankruptcy. 4 Unsatisfied firm obligations may then be proved against
the individual estate. 5 With this in mind, it is evident that the presence
or absence of firm assets should not affect the bankrupt partner's right to
a discharge from both types of obligations. Furthermore, the result obtained by the present rule has the additional advantages of reducing the
complexities of litigation and the expense incident thereto. By enabling
the honest debtor to start anew unhampered by old obligations, an important objective of the Bankruptcy Act once more is obtained.
Conclusion
In view of the widespread interest in the first general revision of the
bankruptcy law since 1898 and the painstaking efforts of its framers to
present as perfect a statute as was humanly possible, it is unfortunate that
the careful attention devoted to many other provisions of the new Act
apparently was denied to those relating to partnership bankruptcies.8 8 As
has been already indicated, the Chandler Act, while providing necessary
clarification especially with regard to many procedural questions, entirely
78. Weinstein, PartnershipBankruptcies (1937) 1I J. N. A. REF. BANK. 63, 64;
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79. E. g., In re Meyers, 97 Fed. 757 (S. D. N. Y. 1890).

8o. Cases denying a discharge because of a failure to lay a proper foundation follow: In re Laughlin, 96 Fed. 589 (N. D. Iowa 1899) ; In re McFaun, 96 Fed. 592 (N.
D. Iowa 1899) ; In re Russell, 97 Fed. 32 (N. D. Iowa 1899) ; In re Morrison, 127
Fed. 186 (W. D. Tex. 19o4).
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overlooks important problems of administration and, moreover, codifies
the more rigid and inequitable interpretations of the former statute with
regard to the right of a partner to a discharge from firm debts after the
adjudication and discharge of the partnership. As a result, however
meritorious the Act may be with regard to its other provisions, with respect to many significant partnership problems, the present need of an
analytical legislative revision is precisely as acute as that which had existed
prior to its enactment.
A. C.

